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Key Insights:
• Peace operations and stability operations both press the decisionmaking locus to much lower
levels than normally experienced in major combat operations.
• These operations allow junior leaders greater latitude and usually end up empowering them
in the exercise of initiative and imagination, a fact not always welcomed by the establishment
after operations cease.
• Despite general European public “shyness” toward casualties, soldiers appear to be seeking
service in these operations as adventure or escape from otherwise routine duties at home.
• The media world has changed, and truth must be sought from multiple sources as CNN seldom
has much to offer.

Discussion.
On June 16-18, 2005, the Strategic Studies Institute co-hosted a conference on “The Impact of Stability
Operations Upon the Armed Forces” in cooperation with the Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de
la Défense, Royal United Services Institute, the Association of the United States Army, the Förderkreis
Deutsches Heer, the Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy, Paris. The audience, by
design and invitation, was small, not exceeding 30 people, to permit extended discussions.
Peace operations and their associated stability undertakings have a very long history, but relatively
little attention has been paid to the impact these have had on military organizations. Obviously the more
such operations a military force is engaged in, the greater effectiveness one would expect, but that effect
seems to run from institutional ad hocery to formalization in doctrine and established policies. Further,
as the conditions under examination generally follow conflict operations of one sort or another, a period
of transition always occurs. In some national security establishments, mechanisms exist to make the

transition relatively easy; in others they do not,
and the transition becomes more difficult.
The conference focused on two objectives:
First, to stimulate research along interdisciplinary
lines concerning the impact of developing trends
in peacekeeping and stability operations over the
long term; and, second, to illuminate the work
of policymakers in the near term as they wrestle
with issues associated with “boots on the ground”
transitioning to low-quarters or even flip-flops.
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director,
Royal United Services Institute, presented the
opening remarks, noting that not-war operations
vary widely. He cited casualty figures versus
days of operations in recent undertakings that
proved that Stability Operations often are deadly.
He noted the centrality of continued civil and
governmental support to the deployed forces, but
questioned the longer-term impact of repetitive
use of Reservists and their relations with their
regular employers. In a Stability Operations
environment, “lessons” need to be “learned” and
implanted in the deployed force rapidly; “an agile
enemy requires an agile response.” Because of the
prevalence of rapid change, training can never be
up-to-date, and everything ultimately will have
to rest on values.
The first panel focused on the “Historical
Context of Western Military Interventions” with
former USAWC Visiting Professor Brian Linn,
Texas A&M University, reviewing the first major
American overseas episode—administering the
Philippines following the Spanish-American
War of 1898. He identified major similarities in
general form between that past and the current
situations, including the unpreparedness of the
U.S. Army to conduct these less-than-normal
combat operations. In both cases, junior officers
became responsible for civil matters well outside
their range of normal training or even authority,
and in both cases, junior leaders were the ones who
figured out how to deal with the most pressing
issues. Atrocities were experienced early in both
operations, and in both cases, the media was the
precipitating vehicle of exposure, but likewise in
both cases, internal remediation was quick and
effective.
The second panel addressed that most timely

hot topic “The Clash of Cultures,” in this case,
particularly from a sociological perspective.
Dr. Leonard Wong, Strategic Studies Institute,
addressed the impact of current stability operations
on U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq from which he
just recently returned. His presentation dealt
with issues of recruiting, retention, the military
family, the psychological impact of repeated
tours in a combat theater, and associated issues of
uncertainty and danger in the midst of a strange
culture. This contrasted in some measure with
a yet-to-be-released German Army survey, two
essentials of which suggested a strong public bias
against German military involvement in casualtyproducing situations, while on the other hand,
exhibiting a strong bias toward German military
involvement in “doing good.” Dr. Christopher
Coker, London School of Economics, addressed
the psychological effects (PTSD, etc.) of casualties
in a “not-war” condition and the effects on
recruiting. He focused his remarks on the belated
recognition that what was first seen as cowardice
in World War I, later came to be described as shellshock and neurasthenia—weakened heart. Today
we are familiar with PTSD, but we also see armies
keeping track of this casualty category and taking
positive actions to ameliorate its effects, such as
mandatory transition counseling. Even the SAS
has a counseling center now, partly in response
to a lawsuit in the UK in which a soldier sued and
won on the basis that he had been traumatized by
action in Bosnia. Coker argued that the concept
of sacrifice is gradually mutating into issues
of “dignity,” which is all about self. This, he
indicated, was just another step down the road of
excusing people from any sense of responsibility
by arguing there is a medical “cause” for what
should better be viewed as normal activity in
stressful conditions.
The third panel was “Operations on ‘Complex
Terrain’: The Law and the Media.” Among
the major changes in the legal landscape is the
prevalence of “terrorists,” who technically operate
outside the law but are currently the major active
adversaries. Mr. Laurent Boussié, Correspondent
for France 2 in the United Kingdom, reflected
on his experiences in Somalia as a reporter. He
noted that during that entire operation, Somalia
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was exporting meat and fruit to South Africa. He
observed further that 80km south of Mogadishu,
in the supposed heart of the famine area, he
found fully productive banana plantations. In
short, he noted that media typically focus on
“sympathy” and “emotional” issues without
much regard for the whole truth—news through
a soda straw. Many reporters are shy about asking
hard questions and will not do so without strong
editorial encouragement. Dr. James Carafano,
Heritage Foundation, took up the issue of the
conduct of operations in the glare of what is
now a multinational, global media operating
under widely varying editorial guidelines. He
challenged several characterizations of media
influence including the time-worn canard that
the media directly influence operations, citing
William Hammond’s work as principal evidence.
Leadership credibility was the single most
important factor in how the general population
responds to news. He argued that anyone can
get whatever media coverage they want, but
that freedom of the press does not mean truth in
presentation. Several participants had suggested
that al Jezerrah was more accurate in its reporting
than CNN, an issue left largely unaddressed by
others. Some discussion was generated by the
comment that truth might be better portrayed if
soldiers were to become reporters. (This would be
a reversion of our Civil War experience, but like
the case of embedded reporters during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, all they would see was what
they saw—through a soda straw. Nevertheless,
the truth of action on the ground might be better
received and result in more sympathetic support
for the troops.)
“Boots on the Ground: Perspectives in Military
and Political Science,” the last panel, pursued
some of the earlier surfaced historical roots, asking
how the several represented national militaries
had adapted to the experiences of engagement
in peacekeeping and stability operations. Intracoalition difficulties are a natural consequence of
the different evolutionary paths and, in one sense,
returned the conferees to the legal issues noted
in the previous panel. In the American case, the
period of Reconstruction, 1865-77, has a direct and
continuing constraining influence. Dr. Douglas

Johnson, Strategic Studies Institute, reviewed
the history of U.S. Army experiences beginning
with General Winfield Scott’s occupation and
subsequent administration of Mexico City
following the 1846 Mexican War, and particularly
emphasized the U.S. Army’s experience during
Reconstruction, which resulted in the exclusion
of serving military from the Posse Comitatus Act.
This was one of the most influential effects of
an historical Stability Operation upon the U.S.
Army, and it continues in evidence with the
military’s reluctance to become engaged in police
activities of any kind despite increasing evidence
that it must. He described the present condition
surrounding the issue of Stability Operations as
revolving around the evolution of Department
of Defense Directive 3000: Department of Defense
Capabilities for Stability Operations which, in its early
iterations, posited conditions that would have the
U.S. Army deployed to the present in Nicaragua,
Haiti, Somalia, Grenada, Lebanon, and dozens
of other places around the world. He concluded
by noting the inclusion of Stability Operations as
a new feature in Joint Doctrine, thus cementing
experience into formal practice.
Major General Carlo Gabigiosu, Italian Army,
recounted his services with multinational forces
in Kosovo and Iraq. His principal point was that
NATO forces worked very well together because
they had become habituated over years of doing
so and had internalized standard operating
procedures and practices. This was obviously not
the case with other coalition members. Since there
had been little in the way of major combat actions
with these groups, interoperability issues were
much simplified—sharing transportation assets is
nowhere as difficult as integrating major weapons
platforms. He also noted the omnipresence of the
media and the shift in attitude and practice from
avoidance at almost any cost, to training—training
on two key principals—tell the truth, or remain
silent. The Stability Operations environment is
not a uniform condition, he noted further, and
may often require overwhelming force at first,
generally moving toward conditions in which
small teams suffice, but high performing staffs
are always crucial.
The conference surfaced numerous issues
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not noted here, but all demanding continuing
investigation and collaboration .
*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/.
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